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ABSTRACr 
The analyses undertaken in this study generate evidence 
supportive 01 the hypothesis that Congress treats the budgets of 
agencies which supply particularistic, constituency-ori ented benefits 
more favorably in el ection y ears than nonel ection y ears . There 
appears not to be any greater el ection y ear generosity on the part 01
Congress with regard to those agencies which p erform primarily 
univ ersa listic services . The data a1so show that congr essional 
appropriations decisions regarding the constituency-oriented agencies 
are also influenced much more strongly by the l evel of unemployment in 
the economy and by the balance 01 party power in the f ederal 
government . It must be stressed, though, that the impact 01 
congressional e1ection year appropriations process is quite limited . 
This is because over all chang es in agency appropriations are much 
more a function 01 the budget estimates submitted to Congress by OMB 
than ot what Congress does to these estimates . And given that there 
were no important differences evident in OMB behavior between el ection 
y ears and nonel ection y ears, over all trends in actual appropriations 
were not much affected by el ection y ear consid erations either .  
IN TJ:l.E MOOD :  THt: EFFEt:r OF ELt:t:rION Yt:AR CUNSlll.r.RATIONS 
UPuN THE APPKOPRIATIONS PKO�t:SS 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
In The Power of the Purse, Fenno (19b6 ) described Congress as 
usually being in an "economy mood ." As long as the well-being OI 
their districts (and thus, they believed, the well-being ot their own 
political careers ) was not directly affec ted, most congressmen 
generally supported the norm of appropriating somewhat less money than 
requested to federal agencies . During the eighteen years Fenno 
observed appropriations politics in Congress, the virtue OI budge tary 
frugality was exemplified by the attitudes and behavior OI members OI 
the Appropriations Committee, and magnified by the powerful role this 
committee playea in the House . 
But sometimes, according to Fenno ' s  account ,  the House and/or 
Senate would be overtaken by a different mood . Hesitating to call it 
a "spending mood," Fenno described it instead as simply a more 
"permissive" attitude toward spending . During such periods Congress 
would become more anxious to avoid the pitfalls of "false economy, " 
and place greater emphasis on making sure federal agencies received 
adequate levels of funding with which to carry out authorized 
programs . 
The basic hypothesis to be examined in this paper is that the 
mood ot Congress is influenced by the proximity of elec tion day . More 
specifically, we would expect Congress to be more generous in its 
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treatment of agency budgets in election years than in nonelection 
years . To be sure, the years Fenno cited as characterized by economy 
moods (1951, 1952, 1957) or permissive moods (1954, 1955, and 195 8) do 
not line up exac tly with the electoral calendar. Be did, however, see 
. the desire for reelection as facilitating permissiveness, as have most 
congressional scholars . Tufte (197 8 ) ,  for instance, points out that 
in some election years the discount rate on austerity programs is so 
high as to simply rule them out of serious consideration (p . 6 0 ) . 
An increase in the saliency of electoral imperatives, 
furthermore, should have the most impact upon the budgets of those 
agencies which supply benefits directly to important groups in 
congressmen ' s  constituencies . Such groups, of course, are the major 
source OI money and other resources congressmen need for their 
reelection campaigns; as many congressional scholars have observed, 
the dictum ot "looking after one's district" is, to most members, 
roughly equivalent to looking af ter the major interest groups in one ' s  
distric t .  True, at n o  time are congressmen ac tually enthusiastic 
about trimming programs which aid key interests in their districts, 
but we would expect that calls for economy in these areas fall upon 
especially deaf ears as the second session of a Congress comes to a 
close .1 We would also expect some reelection-minded members to step
up their efforts at securing more benefits for their districts as 
elec tion day approaches . Indeed, the classic symp tom in Fenno ' s  
diagnosis o t  a "permissive" mood was a flurry of floor amendments 
boosting funding for constituency-oriented programs : 
Three program areas in which the greatest number of 
proposals for floor increases were made and succeeded were 
• • •  Public Works, Interior, and Agriculture. The 
characteristic which these policy areas share is the large 
number of programs which are constituency-oriented . For 
most of the items in these appropriations bills, there is 
a House member or a cluster of House members whose 
constituents are its direct and certain beneficiaries . 
[pp .  487-488] 
Specific agencies cited by Fenno as having cashed in on a 
permissive mood in Congress were the Extension Service, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Mines 
(pp . 488-491). It is federally funded construction projects, though, 
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which reelection-minded congressmen especially value, because they can 
claim full responsibility for having procured the project and its 
attendant benefits [Fenno, 1966; Mayhew, 1974; Ferejohn, 1974; 
Fiorina, 1977]. It would seem likely, therefore, that election year 
generosity would especially favor those agencies which sponsor 
government construction projec ts. 
Probably the best way to begin this analysis is to simply 
examine congressional trea tment of agency budget estimates submitted 
at the beginning of each session by the Office of Management and 
Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget) . It would be very unwise, 
however , to look at the appropriations decisions made by Congress in 
isolation from the rest of the budge tary process . It is highly 
unlikely that OMB budget estimates for government agencies are made 
without at least some consideration of likely congressional action . 
In particular, these estimates may reflect anticipation of greater 
congressional generosity in election years . The exac t form such a 
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strategy would take, unfortunately, is not obvious . OMB might attempt 
a simple compensating approach and submit somewhat lower budge t 
estimates in election years . Alternatively, they might submit 
somewnat higher estimates, thus bending a little in order not to 
provoke Congress into even greater permissiveness . 2 This study will 
explore both possibilities . 
Perhaps most importantly, we must not lose sight of the bottom 
line�the ac tual appropriations which government agencies end up 
receiving . We may find effects associated with election year 
considerations in congressional action on agencies ' budgets, in OMB 
anticipation of what Congress will do , or in both places . The 
question here, however, is whether or not government agencies--
especially those which supply direct, consti tuency-oriented benefits-
-experience more budgetary growth in election years . Subsequent 
analyses undertaken in this paper will attempt to answer this question 
as well. 
Before proceeding, there is a final point which should be made 
about what we are .!!£! attempting to do . This study is not looking for 
a congressional source of political business cycles . Such cycles, of 
course, are hypothesized to result from more expansive fiscal and/or 
monetary policies which incumbent politicians pursue at optimal times 
so as to effec t a surging economy on election day . As will soon be 
seen, though, the agencies and programs analyzed in this study are 
only a large sample of those in existence . They do not include the 
"big ticket" national defense and transfer payment programs, and thus 
account for only a small fraction of total government spending . 
Furthermore, the appropriations figures to be analyzed provide 
virtually no information about the actual timing of government 
expenditures . The budgetary or "check-wri ting n authority they 
represent can be for activities which extend many years into the 
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future . And the budgets which are acted upon in election years are 
for fiscal years which (especially since 1977) are barely under way by 
election day . 
In short, the data to be examined can shed no light on the 
willingness or ability of politicians to influence the short-term 
course of the economy . Our concern, however , is with the somewhat 
narrower question of whether the heightened salience of the electoral 
connection during election years influences the appropriations 
process. For this purpose these data are sui table . 
II . ELECTION YEARS AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS 
As discussed above, the basic hypotheses to be tested in the 
following analysis are: 
J\: Congress is more generous in its treatment of agency 
requests in election years than in nonelection years . 
H2 : The tendency for Congress to treat agency requests more 
generously in elec tion years is strongest for those agencies 
which supply particularistic , constituency-oriented benefits . 
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The dependent variable in the following analysis, then, is the 
percentage change Congress makes in agency budget estimates submitted 
by the Office of .Management and Budge t ( formerly the Bureau of the 
Budget) . These values were derived from the estimates and final 
appropriations figures for 37 executive agencies reported in regular 
annual appropriations acts from fiscal year 1948 through fiscal year 
1979.3 Many agencies often receive addi tional amounts of funding in 
supplemental and deficiencies acts . These figures are almost always 
quite small, however, and including them in the agencies ' yearly 
appropriations totals would have little effect upon the results of 
this analysis .4 On the other hand, the validity of our findings 
probably would be compromised by the substantial inflation which 
occurred during this 32-year period . Estimates and appropriations 
figures were thus divided by the Commerce Departmen t ' s  Implicit Price 
Detlator for Federal Government Purchases of Goods and Services in 
order to convert them into constant dollars . 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
This sample of agencies, listed in Table 1, contains all bu t 3 
of the 3 6  agencies examined by Fenno .5 These agencies were assigned 
to one ca tegory or the other on the basis of the description of their 
activities contained in the United States Government Manual and other 
sources . As Fenno noted , most of the agencies which supply large 
proportions of particularistic, consti tuency-oriented benefits are 
ei ther in the Agriculture and In terior Departments or are considered 
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TABLE 1 a 
AGENCIES CATF.GORIZED BY THE NATURE OF TIIBIR BENEFITSa 
AGENCIES SUPPLYING PARTICULARISTIC, 
CONSTITUENCY-ORIENTED BENEFITS 
Extension Service 
Farmers Home Administration 
Rural Electrification Administration 
Soil Conservation Service 
Forest Service 
Bureau ot Reclamation 
Bureau ot Land Management 
National Park Service 
Bureau ot Indian Affairs 
Fish and Wildlife Service (1948-71) 
Bureau ot Mines (1948-74) 
Bonneville Power Ad.min . (1949-75) 
Office ot Education 
Public Health Service (1948-69) 
Office ot Voe. Rehab. (1948-68) 
NASA (1960-79) 
Corps of Engineers 
Military Construction (1960-79) 
Economic Dev. Ad.min. (1966-79) 
AGENCIES SUPPLYING PR.LMAR.lLY 
UNIVERSALISTIC BENEFITS 
Food and Drug Adminis tration 
Patent Office 
Wea ther Bureau (1948-66} 
Coast and Geodetic Survey (1948-66) 
Geological Survey 
Bureau of Standards (1948-73} 
Census Bureau 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Federal Prison System 
Bureau of Narcotics (1948-69) 
Bureau of Customs 
Bureau of the Public Debt 
Secret Service 
Internal Revenue Service 
Bureau of the Mint 
Bureau of Labor Sta tistics 
Bureau of Labor S tandards (1948-68) 
a Most agencies in this and the succeeding analysis existed
continuously from FY 1948 through FY 1979. If they did not, the years 
in which they were in existence are reported. 
in the Public Works Bill.6 In many cases the placement of an agency 
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in the first ca tegory is also corroborated by the scholarly attention 
it has received in the "subgovernment" literature, which documents the 
symbiotic relationship be tween a particular congressional committee, 
agency and interes t group. Finally, this category was augmented by 
the inclusion of 3 other programs and agencies which sponsor large 
construction projects�the Corps of Engineers, Military Construction, 
the Economic Development Administration�and by the inclusion of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, whose activities are 
concentrated in a number of specific loca tions. 
In contrast to agencies in the first ca tegory, agencies in the 
second perform services which are not directed toward specific 
interest groups, locations, or segments of the population, and 
consequently are not the recipients of strong interest group support. 
Most are engaged in the routine operations of the federal government, 
e.g. law enforcement, revenue collection, and minting currency. The 
others promulgate protective standards and regulations, or are engaged 
in the public provision of scientific, economic , or demographic da ta. 
A classification scheme as simple as this one, of course, 
blurs over a number of important distinctions . The benefits supplied 
by some agencies in the first column accrue in a more direct and 
concentrated fashion to a specific constituency group than do others. 
These agencies also differ considerably in how geographically 
concentrated their bene ficiaries are; recipients of power supplied by 
the Bonneville Power Administration, for example, reside in several 
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congressional districts in the Pacific Northwest, while the Off ice of 
Educa tion funded school construc tion in every district in the country. 
It is a!so true that the character of some agencies changes over time; 
the rise of the Sagebush Rebellion in several Western states, for 
example, suggests that the Bureau of Land Management is no longer as 
completely beholden to local ranching interests as McConnell's (1966) 
s tudy had indicated. 
There were also a few agencies which did not fit as cleanly 
into the second ca tegory as we would have liked. To be sure, a purely 
universalistic good probably exists only in theory--some groups or 
individuals are always going to derive more bene fit from a publlc good 
than others. But we did have some reservations with the Bureau of the 
Mint and Federal Prison System, which operate facilities in a fairly 
small number of specific loca tions, and which were occasionally 
appropriated relatively large amounts of funds for new construction. 
It is a1so the case that advertisers, real estate developers, and 
similar businesses have come to make heavy use of Census Bureau da ta, 
and that the Cus toms Service has recently won considerable favor from 
domestic clothing and appliance manufacturers for i ts vigorous efforts 
in enforcing anti-dumping and counterfeit label statutes. For the 
most part, however, the benefits provided by these agencies were not, 
during the time period under consideration, targeted at a particular 
interest group or segment of the population. On the whole, then, the 
agencies listed in Table 1 generally reside quite com fortably in the 
ca tegory to which they have been assigned. 
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In order to accurately estimate the effects of election year 
considerations it is necessary to take into account a number of other 
variables�insti tutional, economic, and political---which also affect 
congressional appropriations decisions. Perhaps the most immediate 
influence upon what Congress does in this regard is the behavior of 
the Office of Management and Budget. There is considerable evidence 
that Congress tends to act like an appeals court (Sharkansky, 1965; 
Wanat, 1978). Additional funds are often granted to an agency for 
whom OMB submitted a low estimate. Conversely, an agency whose OMB 
estimate represents a big jump over its appropriations in the previous 
year can expect somewhat less favorable treatment from Congress. 
Economic conditions also appear to influence congressional 
appropriations decisions. Fenno (1966), for instance, believed that
the onset of the 1954 and 1958 recessions helped trigger a "permissive 
mood" in those years. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1974) indicate
that the already high statis tical predic tive power of their budget 
equations was often enhanced by the specifica tion of a battery of 
economic variables. The received wisdom of at least some 
macroeconomists is that goveruments should decrease spending in 
response to inflation and increase spending in response to 
unemployment. We will hypothesize, then, that high rates of 
unemployment will lead Congress to treat OMB budget estimates more 
generously, but high rates of inflation will produce less favorable 
congressional treatment. 
Another factor which exerts a clear, continuous influence upon 
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the appropriations process is party politics, or, more specific ally, 
whether the Congress and the Presidency are con trolled by the 
Democrats or by the Republicans . Fenno ' s  study, based primarily upon 
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, illustrated marked pa tterns 
of partisan conflict and cooperation between Congress and the 
President . In the years during the Truman administration in which 
they controlled Congress, the Republicans slashed agency estimates, 
especi ally in the areas of labor programs and public power . The 
Democratic Congresses of the Eisenhower and Nixon years, on the other 
hand, generally cut much less from OMB estimates, and often 
appropri ated more than OMB had requested . 
The actual model to be estimated, then, is the following 
form : 7 
ACONG. 
1 ai· + P1iAOMBi + P2iu + p3i
1 + P4iP + PsiE + µi 
where ACONG. 
1 
the ch ange Congress makes in an agency ' s  OMB budget 
estimate in awarding appropriations, as a percentage of 
that estimate . 
ai = a constant term . 
AOMBi the percentage ch ange represented by the OMB budget 
estimate for an agency over the appropriations awarded 
to th at agency in the previous fiscal year . 
U = the average r ate of unemployment in the previous fiscal 
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year (computed from monthly data provided by the Bureau 
of L abor Statistics) . 
I = the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index during 
p 
the previous fiscal year . 
the party agreement index . This variable takes on the 
value of 0 when the Congress and Presidency were 
controlled by the same party, +l when Congress was 
controlled by the Democrats and the President was a 
Republican, and -1 when the Congress was controlled by 
the Republicans and the President was Democratic . 
E = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 for 
budgets considered during election ye ars ( the second 
session of each Congress) ,  0 otherwise . It should be 
noted that appropriations decisions concern the 
upcoming fiscal year. So while congressional elections 
are held in even-numbered years, the budgets considered 
by Congress just prior to the election are for odd-
numbered fiscal years . 
To summarize, we expect the signs of the election year dummy 
to be positive, and the coefficients to be larger for those agencies 
supplying direct, consti tuency-oriented benefits than for those which 
supply largely universalistic benefits . Signs of the OMB terms are 
predicted to be negative, as we h ave hypothesized Congress to treat 
relatively small OMB estimates more generously and relatively large 
estimates with less generosity. Estimates of the unemployment terms 
should be positive in direction, while those of the inflation term 
should be negative. And if Democrats do favor greater budgetary 
growth than Republicans, estimates of the party agreement should be 
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positive. Finally, it should be noted again that these equations are 
attempting to predict the percentage change Congress makes in OJIB 
budget estimates for these agencies. They are different in form from 
the budgetary equations Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky (1966, 1973) 
estimated, which attempted to predict the actual amount Congress 
appropriated by the amount of the OJIB estimate. These variables, of 
course, both exhibit a strong upward trend over time, and thus their 
equations usually produced very high 'fls (.9S and higher). The 
percentage change variables being used here, however, do not 
incorporate these trends, and so we should not expect the �s for our 
equations to be as high.8 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2. The top 
numbers in each entry are the unstandardized OLS regression 
coefficients, the numbers in parentheses below are the standard 
errors. OLS estimates may be biased if a large amount of serial 
correlation is present. The Durbin-Watson statistics reported in 
Table 2 ,  though, are quite well-behaved; in only 6 of the 37 equations 
are they less than l.S or greater than 2.S. 
[TABI..t; 2 HERE] 
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TABLE 2 
THE EFFECT OF ELECTION YEARS AND OTHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES UPON CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS 
c AOMB u 
Agencies Supplying Particularistic, 
Constituency-Oriented Benefits 
Extension Svc. 
Farmers Home 
Administration 
Rural Electri­
fication Admin. 
Soil Conservation 
Service 
Forest Service 
Bureau of 
Reclamation 
Bureau of Land 
Management 
National Park 
Service 
Bureau of 
Indian Affairs 
Fish and Wild­
Life Service 
Bureau of Mines 
-.046 
-.108 
-.062 
. 012 
-.083 
-.147 
-.073 
-.149 
-.1S7 
.037 
-.167 
Bonneville Power -.1S7 
Administration 
-.083 
(. OSl) 
-.161 
(.117) 
-.194•• 
(.OS7) 
-.402•• 
( .112) 
-.102 
(.100) 
-.031 
(.OS4) 
-.114• 
(.OS3) 
-.023 
( .04S) 
-.191•• 
( .OS3) 
-.141• 
( .061) 
-.004 
( .078) 
.06S 
C. 060) 
.013• 
(. OOS) 
.014 
( .028) 
. 010• 
(.004) 
. 006 
( . 008) 
.023• 
(. 010) 
.019 
(.014) 
. oos 
( .008) 
.020• 
(.010) 
. 024 
( .007) 
-.000 
( .014) 
.020 
(. 013) 
.004 
(.020) 
I 
. ooo 
(. 001) 
.008 
(. 011) 
-.003•• 
(.001) 
-.oos• 
(.003) 
-.ooo 
(.003) 
-.oos 
( . 004) 
.002 
( .002) 
-.004 
(.004) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.011•• 
(.004) 
-.002 
(. 004) 
-.010• 
(.OOS) 
p 
.019• 
(.011) 
.117• 
( . 064) 
. 014 
(.010) 
. 024 
( .018) 
.021 
(.020) 
. 068• 
( . 032) 
.024 
( .018) 
.064•• 
( . 022) 
. os1• 
(.016) 
. 047* 
(.024) 
.069• 
(.022) 
. 119* 
( .03 8) 
E 
. 018 
( .012) 
. OS2 
( .069) 
.014 
(. 011) 
.011 
(.021) 
-.OlS 
(.023) 
. 003 
( . 036) 
.030 
(.020) 
. 012 
( .02S) 
. 029 
( .018) 
. 03S 
( .02s) 
. 044 
( .027) 
. 075• 
( . 03S) 
R2 D.W. 
.42 2.16 
.24 2.19 
.S2 2.24 
.40 2.33 
.2S 1.83 
. 34 1.7S 
.28 1.81 
.4S 1.8S 
. 69 1.97 
.74 1.46 
.S3 2.11 
. SS 1.60 
Corps of 
Engineers 
Military 
Construction 
NASA 
Economic 
Dev. Admin. 
Office ot 
Voe. Rehab. 
Public Health 
Service 
Office of 
Education 
lS 
Table 2 continued 
c AO.MB u I p E R2 D.W. 
-.18s -.231• . 028•• . 001 .069•• . 01s . s9 1.31 
(.102) (.011) (. 004) (.027) (.027) 
-.224 -.079•• . 016• . 001• . 001 . 001 .68 1.98 
(.024) (.008) (.004) (.023) (.021) 
-.098 -.014 . 009 . 001 . 032• . 014 .49 2. lS 
(.023) (. 006) (. 003) (.OlS) (.014) 
-.S07 -.109 . 103•• -.019 .139• . 03S .83 1.17 
(.139) (.022) (.OlS) (.071) (. 062) 
. 088 -.164• -.019 -.004 . 034 . 020 .4S 2.16 
(. 070) (.016) (.OOS) (.032) (.032) 
-.367 -.414• . 080.. . 008• . 14s• . o4s• .91 i.62 
(.069) (.013) (. 004) (.027) (.02S) 
-.214 -.032 .044• -.004 .089• -.016 .40 1.70 
(.027) (.020) (. 006) (. 04S) (.049) 
Agencies Supplying 
Primarily Universalistic Benefits 
Food and Drug -.OS8 -.lOS• . 009 -.000 . 041•• -.002 .38 2.09 
Administration ( . OS4) ( . 007) ( .002) ( . OlS) ( . 016) 
Federal Bureau -.014 -.014 .003• . 000 .001 .002 . 16 2.26 
of Investigation ( .024) ( . 002) ( .001) ( . 004) ( . 004) 
Immigration and -.067 -.2S2•• . 012•• . 000 .013* -.001 . 63 1.S9 
Natural. Svc. (. 060) (.003) (.001) (.017) (. 008) 
Federal Prison 
System 
Bureau of 
Narcotics 
Bureau of 
Customs 
Bureau of the 
Public Debt 
-.064 -.233•• . 004 .ooo .oos . 020 .44 1.99 
(.060) (.008) (.002) (.020) (.019) 
-.02S -.007 .oos -.002 -.004 .016 .32 2.20 
(.047) (. OOS) (.002) (. 010) (.009) 
-.4S3 -.108•• . oos•• . 001 . 014•• . 010• . 10 1.69 
(.022) (.002) (.001) (. OOS) (.OOS) 
-.03S -.24S•• -.001 -.001 .02S .021 .39 2.30 
(.078) (. 008) (.002) (. 016) (. 018) 
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Table 2 continued 
c AOMB u I p E J?- D.W. 
Secret Service -.017 -.036 .006 -.oos .004 -.004 .11 1.88 
(.113) (.010) (. 003) (.024) (.02S) 
Internal Revenue -.042 -.136• . 006 -.002 . 024•• -.OOS .SS 2.04 
Service (. OS6) (. 003) (. 001) (.007) (.008) 
Bureau of the 
Mint 
-.OlS -.073•• . 001 -.010 -.020 . 013 . 38 1.23 
(.027) (.012) (. 004) (. 026) (.029) 
Bureau of Labor -.171 -.191• . 030•• -.011•• . os1•• . 022 .70 1.61 
Statistics (.082) (.009) (. 003) (.019) (.021) 
Bureau of Labor -.113 -.121•• . 033 -.026•• -.OlS -.028 .81 1.89 
Standards ( .048) ( . 022) (.007) ( . 043) ( .044) 
Patent Office . 014 -.2s8•• -.001 -.003 . 026• -.019 .41 1.61 
(.098) (.OOS) (.002) (. 013) (.014) 
Weather Bureau .078 .138 -.028 -.004 .OS3 -.006 . 29 1.S3 
(.128) (.023) (. 006) (.040) (.040) 
Geological Survey -.147 -.21s•• . 027•• -.004 . 043• . 003 .71 1.3S 
(. 069) (.008) (.003) (.020) (.020) 
Coast and -.080 -.100•• . 006 -.002 .02S .024 .S8 2.7S 
Geodetic Survey (.033) (.008) (.002) (.OlS) (. OlS) 
National Bureau -.270 -.783 .022 .006 .062• . 048 .27 1.SS 
of Standards ( .OS2) ( . 019) ( . OOS) ( .033) ( . 03S) 
Census Bureaua -.336 -.110• . OS2 -.017 -.031 .188• . 33 2.SO 
( . OS4) ( . 036) ( . 012) ( . 084) ( . 098) 
a The equation estimated for the Census Bureau also included dummy 
variables to register the impact of the constitutionally mandated decennial 
censuses. 
Significance tests are one-tailed. •• = p < .01; • = p < .OS. 
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The figures in Table 2 indicate that although only 4 estimates 
of the election year term are statistically significant, the signs of 
the estimates are in the predicted (positive) direction for 28 of the 
37 agencies being examined. Given that the time series never exceed 
32 years and are frequently shorter, conventional levels of 
significance become difficult to achieve with effects of the magnitude 
associated with the electoral dummy. It is prudent, therefore, to 
take account of the overall pattern of results. A null hypothesis 
that there is no difference in congressional behavior between election 
years and nonelection years implies that the sign of each estimate has 
a .5 probability of being either positive or negative. According to 
the relevant binomial probability distribution, that 28 of the 37 
estimates were in the predicted direction means that this hypothesis 
can be rejected at the .01 level. There is, then, a glimmer of 
evidence for the proposition that Congress is somewhat more generous 
in its treatment of OMB budget estimates in election years. 
But when those agencies supplying direct, constituency­
oriented benefits are considered separately from those supplying more 
collective benefits, it is clear that any evidence of greater election 
year generosity is largely confined to the former category. Of the 19 
agencies in this group, 17 tended to fare better in election years 
than in nonelection years. This was true of only 11 of the 18 
agencies supplying more universalistic benefits. Similarly, the 
median estimate in the first category of agencies was .018, compared 
to .003 in the second category. Although only 2 of the 20 estimates 
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in the first category are significant at the p < .OS level, 5 others 
would satisfy the p < .10 criterion. And looking at the overall 
pattern of results, we can with a binomial probability test 
overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis (no difference between 
election years and nonelection years) for the first group (p < .001), 
while for the second category we cannot even come close. In short, 
the evidence in Table 2 does provide some support for our second 
hypothesis, i.e. that the tendency for Congress to treat agency 
requests more generously in election years is strongest for those 
agencies which directly supply particularistic, constituency-oriented 
benefits. Election year permissiveness, however, does not appear to 
extend very far among those agencies providing benefits which are more 
universalistic in nature. 
As discussed earlier, we had suspected that agencies which 
sponsor federally funded construction projects would be especially 
benefited by election year considerations. Th.is is because of the 
large measure of personal credit congressmen can take for securing 
such projects and attendant benefits for their districts. Contrary to 
our expectations, however, such agencies were not singled out for 
special favor. Estimates of the election year dummy for the Corps of 
Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Economic Development 
Administration�.015, .003, .001, and .035, respectively--tended, if 
anything, to be smaller than estimates for other agencies in this 
category. To be sure, there are a number of factors which might serve 
to mitigate against an easily recognizable electoral cycle in spending 
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for "pet" projects. As Ferejohn (1974) notes, the Corps of Engineers 
receives appropriations on a year by year basis, even though its 
projects usually take 10 or more years to complete. As a result. 
decisions made over the previous 10 to 15 years create current 
spending obligations amounting to about 95 percent of the Corp's 
budget for a particular fiscal year. More importantly. once a project 
is undertaken funding for it is primarily a function of the 
construction schedule draYll up by the Corps, which is in turn largely 
determined by engineering requirements and other physical features of 
the project. 
An important alternative hypothesis, of course. is that while 
overall appropriations for construction projects are not sensitive to 
the electoral calendar, the timing of announcements for new 
feasibility studies, surveys. planning starts. and new projects starts 
might be. Anagnason (1982), for instance, presents evidence 
indicating that the processing time for EDA and HUD grant applications 
and the number of grant award announcements appear to pick up as 
election day approaches. Testing this hypothesis. though. is beyond 
the scope of the present study. 
At any rate. the hypothesis that any tendency for Congress to 
treat agency requests more generously in election years would be 
stronger for those agencies which supply particularistic, 
constituency-oriented benefits did receive some support. Whether one 
wishes to characterize these effects as large or small probably 
depends on one's perspective. The median estimate of this term for 
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agencies in this category • •  018, implies that the change Congress 
makes in such an agency's budget estimate is. as a percentage of that 
estimate, about 2 percent larger in an election year.9 In relation to 
the typical change Congress makes, an effect of this magnitude is 
,, fairly large; such changes rarely exceed plus or minus 10 percent, and 
are usually less than 5 percent. And in the case of a large agency. 2 
percent of its budget amounts to many millions of dollars. On the 
other hand, an additional 2 percent in the appropriations it receives 
will probably not, for the typical agency, allow for any important 
expansion in its activities. Nor is this 2 percent something which 
can be readily counted upon; the large standard errors associated with 
the election year dummies (and the resultant few significant 
estimates) indicate an effect which is erratic and uncertain. 
But more importantly. the effects upon congressional 
appropriations decisions exerted by the other variables specified in 
these equations are generally much more impressive than the influence 
exerted by election year considerations. First, Congress clearly and 
consistently reacts to the nature of the estimate submitted by OMB . 
Of the 37 estimates for this term reported in Table 2. 35 were in the 
predicted (negative) direction, and a large majority (22) were 
significant at the p < .05 level. 
Secondly. congressional action on OMB estimates was responsive 
to the rate of unemployment; 32 of the 37 estimates were in the 
predicted (positive) direction. and 13 were statistically significant. 
In contrast. the pace of inflation in the previous fiscal year had no 
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apparent effect. Barely half (23) of the estimates for this term were 
in the predicted (negative) direction, and most of them were clustered 
closely around zero. 
Thirdly, the other political variable in the equation�the 
party agreement index�also registered strong and consistent effects. 
In 33 of the 37 equations reported in Table 2 the estimate of this 
term was in the predicted (positive) direction, and 21 of the 
estimates were statistically significant. The median estimate of .032 
implies that a given agency would receive, as a percentage of its OMB 
estimate, 3.2 percent more from a Democratic Congress facing a 
Republican President than from a Democratic Congress facing a 
President of the same party. The partisan conflict registered by this 
variable, of course, is manifested in the interaction between Congress 
and OMB, ; nothing is implied about the behavior of either institution 
apart from the other. The strong effects associated with the party 
agreement index do indicate, though, that the role party differences 
play in the budgetary process is a large one. 
As indicated above, evidence of greater election year 
generosity on the part of Congress was largely confined to those 
agencies providing particularistic, constituency-oriented benefits. 
The results displayed in Table 2 also revealed other interesting 
differences between the two sets of agencies. First, our model of 
congressional appropriations decisions does a better job overall of 
explaining the data in the first category, i.e. the agencies
_ 
which 
provide particularistic, constituency-oriented benefits, then in the 
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second category; median R2s were .49 and .39, respectively. One 
variable in particular which exerted a stronger influence in the first 
category than in the second was unemployment. The median estimate in 
the former group was .016, compared to .006 in the latter. Given the 
way these variables were scaled, an estimate of .016 implies that an 
additional 1 percent in unemployment results in a 1.6 percent increase 
in agency appropriations. Furthermore, congressional response to 
unemployment appeared to be particularly strong with regard to those 
agencies which sponsor major construction projects. Estimates of the 
unemployment term for the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, 
Military Construction, and Economic Development Administration were 
.028, .019, .016, and .103 respectively (3 of the 4 were statistically 
significant). As indicated earlier, these agencies were apparently 
not the objects of greater congressional year generosity. Evidently, 
though, Congress has reacted to high levels of joblessness in much the 
same manner as have govermnents going back to the pharaohs--with more 
and/or bigger public works projects (Garraty, 1978). 
Another variable which registered stronger effects in the 
first category was the party agreement index. Budgets of agencies 
supplying particularistic, constituency-oriented benefits were a good 
deal more likely to be the objects of partisan controversy; of the 18 
estimates of the party agreement index in this category, 13 were 
statistically significant, compared to 8 of the 18 estimates in the 
other category. Median estimates were .051 and .014, respectively. 
Perhaps this pattern of results should not come as too much of a 
surprise. In a large sense. the Republican ideal of less government 
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intervention in society and in the economy ultimately means providing 
fewer government goods and services to fewer groups of people. True, 
there are agencies supplying primarily universalistic benefits over 
which we would expect to observe partisan conflict and in fact do. 
Some of the largest estimates of the party agreement index in this 
category were for the Food and Drug Administration, a major regulatory 
agency, and (consistent with Fenno's account) the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Congressional action on the budgets of most agencies in 
this category, however, was not much affected by the balance of party 
power in the federal government. Indeed, none of the variables in our 
equations had much effect upon appropriations decisions regarding a 
number of agencies here, e. g. the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Secret Service, or Bureau of Narcotics. Most of the time Congress 
simply appropriated them an amount equal to the OMB estimate, and any 
changes which were made were tiny. The R2s for these agencies' 
equations were consequently quite low. 
Before continuing, it is probably best to quickly summarize 
the results of this analysis. In its appropriations decisions, 
Congress has tended to treat the OMB estimates for agencies which 
provide particularistic, constituency-oriented benefits more favorably 
in election years than in nonelection years. This tendency does not 
appear to extend very far among those agencies providing benefits 
which are primarily universalistic in nature, nor are those agencies 
which sponsor construction projects singled out for special favor in 
election years. Congressional action on the budgets of these two 
categories of agencies differed in other important ways as. well. 
Appropriations decisions regarding those agencies which supply 
24 
constituency-oriented benefits were influenced much more strongly by 
the level of unemployment in the U.S. economy and by whether it was 
the Democrats or the Republicans who were in control of Congress and 
the Presidency. Finally, although the effects associated with 
election year considerations were not trivial, the other political. 
economic, and institutional variables which were specified in our 
model played much more important roles in the appropriations process. 
III. AGENCY BUDGET ESTDIATES SUBMITTED BY OMB 
In examining the effect of election year considerations upon 
the budgetary process, this study has looked only at the changes 
Congress makes in OMB estimates. However, the budget estimates for 
government agencies OMB submits to Congress at the beginning of each 
session may reflect anticipation of greater congressional generosity 
in e1ection years. We would expect, though, that O.MB responds to many 
of the same institutional, economic, and political factors which 
affect congressional appropriations decision. In order to accurately 
gauge the degree to which OMB estimates differ from election years to 
nonelection years it is thus important to specify these other 
variables. The model to be estimated, then, is as follows: 
AO.MB. 
1 ai + P1iACONGPFYi + P2iu + P3il + P4iP + Psi
E + µi 
where AOMB. 
1 the percentage change represented by the OMB estimate 
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for an agency over the appropriations it received in the 
11. 
1 
ACONGPFY. 
1 
previous fiscal year. 
a constant term. 
the percentage change Congress made in an agency's OMB 
estimate in awarding it appropriations during the 
previous fiscal year. 
U = average unemployment rate in the previous fiscal year. 
I percentage change in the Consumer Price Index in the 
previous fiscal year. 
P = the party agreement index (this is the same variable 
specified in the previous set of equations). 
E = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 for 
budget submitted in election years, i.e. odd-numbered 
fiscal years, 0 otherwise. 
As before, we hypothesize there to be an inverse relationship 
between budgetary actions taken by Congress and actions taken by OMB; 
ceteris paribus, agencies which received relatively generous treatment 
from Congress in the previous fiscal year will receive a relatively 
lower OMB estimate. The ACONGPFY terms should thus have negative 
signs. Our predictions about the unemployment term and inflation 
terms are the same as before, i. e. signs of the estimates will be 
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positive for the former but negative for the latter. 
The party agreement index is again meant to reflect Democratic 
and Republican differences over the desirability of government growth. 
If these differences are present, the percentage growth represented by 
OMB estimates over an agency's previous fiscal year appropriations 
should be relatively smaller when a Republican administration faces a 
Democratic Congress, but relatively larger when the administration is 
Democratic and the Congress Republican. Because the first situation 
is valued -1 and the second valued +1, signs of the estimates of the 
party agreement index should be negative, not positive as in the 
previous analysis. 
The final variable is the election year dummy. As was 
indicated in the introduction, two plausible strategies which OMB 
might adopt run in exactly opposite directions. A simple compensatory 
strategy would lead to somewhat lower OMB estimates in election years; 
alternatively, OMB might attempt to accomodate Congress by submitting 
somewhat higher estimates in election years so as not to provoke even 
greater generosity. In the following analysis we will thus look for 
estimates running strongly in either a negative or positive election. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 .  As 
before, the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that serial correlation 
does not pose any real problems. On the other hand, the model which 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
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TABLE 3 
THE EFFECT OF ELECTION YEARS AND OTHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES UPON OMB ESTIMATES 
c LICONGPFY U I p E R2 D.W. 
Agencies Supplying Direct, 
Constituency=-Oriented Benefits 
Extension Svc. 
Farmers Home 
Administration 
Rural Electri­
fication Admin. 
.183 -.292 -.028 -.010 .045 .011 .23 2.12 
(.654) (.020 ) (.020 ) (.042) (.046 ) 
.15 7 -.3 84 -.018 .011 .022 -.03 6 .09 2.48 
(.3 14) (.048) (.018 )  (.110 ) (.117 ) 
.022 .477 .010 -.008• -.047 .022 .11 1.18 
(.5 21 )  (.015 ) (.005 ) (.03 4) (.03 6 )  
Soil Conservation .062 .016 -.001 -.010* -.016 -.024 .1 8 1.78 
Service ( .3 03 ) ( .014) ( .004) ( .033 ) C.035 )  
Forest Service 
Bureau of 
Reclamation 
Bureau of Land 
Management 
National Park 
Service 
-.087 .061 .040• -.011• -.03 1 -.026 .26 1.83 
(.399) (.021 ) (.006 ) (.040 ) C.045 ) 
-.204 -1.5 73•• .023 .004 .005 .174 .3 1 2.09 
.06 8 
(.6 12) (.047 ) (.014) (.120 ) (.114) 
.031 .021 -.007 -.056 .070 .09 2.00 
(.5 81) (.03 0 )  (.010 ) (.065)  (.071) 
.109 -1.260* .029 -.041•• .083 -.088 .32 1.62 
( .687 ) ( .044) ( .013 ) ( .099) ( .103 ) 
Bureau ot· .277 .081 -.025 -.012 -.071 .080 .1 8 2.23 
Indian Affairs (.556 ) (.033 ) (.008) (.064) (.06 7 )  
Fish and Wild- -.096 -.741 .049 -.009 -.034 -.023 .19 2.23 
Life Service ( .495 ) ( .049 ) ( .014) ( .092) ( .094) 
Bureau ot" Mines .217 .088 -.035 .000 -.060 .127 .21 2.25 
( .623 ) (.03 9)  (.011 ) ( .071) C.076 ) 
Bonneville Power -.3 17 -1.090• .101 .008 -.261* .004 .SO 1.52
Administration C.5 7 8 )  (.062) (.016 ) (.11 8) (.121 ) 
Corps of 
Engineers 
Military 
Construction 
NASA 
Economic 
Dev. Admin. 
Office ot· 
Voe. Rehab. 
Public Heal th 
Service 
Office o:t 
Education 
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Table 3 continued 
c LICONGPFY U I P E p}- D. W. 
.006 -.2 94 .010 .003 -.106• .028 .3 0 1.28 
( .3 06 ) ( .022) (.007)  ( .05 0 )  ( . oso) 
1.350 2.027 -.120 -.008 -.224 -.189 .20 2.76 
(2.211 )  (.103 ) (.044) (.249) (.228) 
-.260 -.651 .126• -.010• -.059 .084 .43 0 .92 
(2.801 ) (.071)  (.03 1 )  (.181 ) (.169) 
-.5 73 -1.421** .104* .065 -.3 75•• -.178 .75 2.70 
(.43 6 )  (.055 ) (.022) (.116 ) (.106 ) 
.196 1.5 12 .012 .004 -.051 -.048 .31 2.05 
(.6 87 ) (.053 ) (.015 ) (.107 ) (.106 ) 
-.444 -.865* .117• .021 .035 -.065 .44 2.13 
(.3 41 ) (.047 ) (.012) (.090 ) (.079)  
.743 -.5 89 -.077 .024 -.272 .042 .09 2.23 
(l.220) (.15 6 )  (.046 ) (.322) (.3 5 8 )  
Agencies Supplying 
Primarily Universalistic Benefits 
Food and Drug 
Administration 
.047 .434 .033 -.016• -.03 9 -.014 .22 2.17 
(.615 ) (.024) (.007 )  (.05 7 )  (.05 8 )  
Federal Bureau .078 -1.620 .000 .004 -.027 -.066 .17 1.82 
of Investigation ( 1.040) (.014) ( .005 ) ( .032)  ( .03 4) 
Immigration and 
Natural. Svc. 
Federal Prison 
System 
Bureau of 
Narcotics 
Bureau of 
Customs 
Bureau of the 
Public Debt 
.133 .380 -.041 -.002 .034 -.028 .20 1.90 
(.424) (.011) (.003 ) (.022) (.025 ) 
.119 • 712 -.008 .001 .195 .017 .33 2.19 
(.501) (.025 ) (.008) (.05 7 )  (.062) 
.183 -.846 -.020 -.010 -.007 -.001 .14 2.36 
(1.201) (.026 ) (.008 )  (.055 ) (.053 ) 
.041 .583 -.008 .018 -.004 -.017 .28 1.60 
( 1.140 ) (.019 ) (.006 ) (.044) (.048) 
-.186 -1.272•• .03 7• -.001 .032 -.05 8 .47 1.67 
(.349) (.015 ) (.005 ) ( .03 4) ( .03 8) 
c 
Secret Service .094 
Internal Revenue .079 
Service 
Bureau of the - .144 
Mint 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Bureau of Labor 
Standards 
Patent Office 
Weather Bureau 
- .147 
- .454 
.092 
- .235 
Geological Survey .014 
Coast and - .196 
Geodetic Survey 
National Bureau 
of Standards 
Census Bureaua 
- .3 94 
.457 
Table 3 continued 
LlCONGPFY 
- .127 
( .33 0) 
.066 
( .5 73 ) 
.040 
( 1 .221 )  
- .928 .. 
( .279 ) 
- .953 
( .667)  
.130 
( .35 6 )  
- .289 
( .616 ) 
- .532 
( .3 73 ) 
.748 
(2 .151) 
. 700 
( . 890) 
- .3 16 
( .  734) 
u 
- .002 
( .018) 
.002 
( .011 ) 
.039 
( .090) 
I 
- .002 
( .005 ) 
- .006• 
( .003 ) 
.008 
( .028) 
. 054 .. - .008 
( .018) ( .005 ) 
.139 
( .115 )  
- . 002 
( .012) 
.073 
C .046 ) 
.030 
( .022) 
.058 
( .065 )  
.126 
( .077 ) 
.024 
( .13 8 )  
.068 
( . 032) 
- .002 
( .004) 
- .003 
C .013 ) 
.009 
( .00 7 )  
.006 
( .018) 
.029 
( .022) 
- .048 
C .045 ) 
p 
.070 
( .03 9 )  
- .016 
C .027 ) 
.050 
( .189 )  
- .002 
( .042) 
- .016 
( . 223 ) 
- .010 
( .029 ) 
.000 
( .101) 
- .102• 
( .05 6 )  
.041 
( .164) 
.149 
( .140 ) 
- .411 
( .334) 
E 
-.023 
C .044) 
- .009 
( .027 ) 
.137 
( .213 ) 
- .056 
( . 042) 
- .3 03 
( .215 ) 
- .033 
( .029) 
- .012 
( .088) 
- .082 
( .052) 
.063 
( .13 5 )  
.024 
( .154) 
- .048 
( .390) 
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R2 D . W .  
. 14 1 .3 8  
.11 2 . 3 4  
.03 2 .41 
.41 1 .84 
.47 2 .44 
.06 1 .45 
.24 2 . 72 
.44 2 .5 7  
.11 1 .42 
.22 1 .43 
. 75 2 .3 1  
a The equation for the Census Bureau also included dummy variables to 
control for the effects of the constitutionally mandated decennial censuses . 
Significance tests for the election year dummy were two-tailed . All others 
were one tailed . •• = p < .01; • = p < .05 . 
3 0  
was estimated here did a much poorer job o f  explaining the data than 
did the model of congressional appropriations decisions . The median 
R2 was only .23, compared to .45 in the previous set of equations . 
Also in contrast to the previous analysis, the model did no better 
. predicting mm action on budgets of the constituency-oriented agencies 
than on the budgets of agencies providing primarily universalistic 
services; median �s for each category ( .23 and .22, respectively ) 
were virtually identical . 
With such low �s it is not surprising that none of the 
variables had much systematic effect either . With the election year 
dummy, of course, we were looking for coefficients to run strongly in 
either a negative or positive direction . Overall, though, there is 
not much of anything going on here . A slight majority (23 ) of the 
signs were negative, but none were statistically significant in either 
direction . 
When the two categories of agencies are considered separately, 
however, we see that the negative coefficients tend to be associated 
with the agencies which provide primarily universalistic benefits . Of 
the 1 8  election year terms in this category, 14 are negative, compared 
to 9 of 19 for the agencies which are constituency-oriented . The only 
trouble is that if OMB were to counter Congress by submitting somewhat 
lower estimates in election years, it should have done so for the 
constituency-oriented agencies . If there is a real effect here, then, 
it is for the wrong set of agencies . We are thus inclined not to 
attach much importance to this difference between agency categories . 
3 1  
The performance of the other variables in the equations was 
similarly lackluster. Although Congress appeared to systematically 
react to the nature of the estimated submitted by OMB for a particular 
government agency, OMB does no appear to have reacted to what Congress 
had done to an agency's estimate in the previous fiscal year. Only 20 
of the 37 coefficients for the ACONGPFY term were in the predicted 
(negative) direction, although a fair number ( 7 )  were statistically 
significant. The economic variables also added very little to our 
ability to predict OMB action on agency budgets. Only about two 
thirds of the unemployment term coefficients and barely half of the 
inflation term coefficients were in the predicted direction. The lack 
of support for the hypotheses concerning the economic variables is 
somewhat surprising, given that the level of government spending is 
perhaps the most important macroeconomic policy over which the 
executive branch can exert some control. 
There is a little consolation, perhaps, in the fact that the 
party agreement index tended to pick up effects consistent with our 
predictions in the constituency-oriented category; of the 19 
coefficients, 14 bore the predicted (negative) sign. Overall, 
however, the performance of this index, which had registered such 
strong, consistent effects in the congressional equations, failed to 
give any real support to the hypothesis of party differences. Only 23 
were in the predicted direction, and only 4 were statistically 
significant. 
It is probable that we could find other variables (or other 
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specifications of the variables which are already in the model) which 
would lead to improvements in explanatory power. Trying some of the 
more obvious alternatives, though, did little to help matters. One 
might hypothesize, for example, that during Republican administrations 
OMB might submit lower estimates regardless of the make-up of the 
Congress. But a dummy variable which took on the value of 1 when the 
President was Republican and 0 when he was a Democrat worked no better 
than the party agreement index. 
Similarly, a potential problem with the economic variables is 
the fact that OMB submits its budget estimates when only half (and 
since 1977, only a quarter) of the year these two variables reflect 
has actually elapsed. Our decision to specify these variables in this 
manner was made out of a sense that OMB would want budget estimates to 
be responsive to economic conditions which obtained at the time the 
next fiscal year began, and that by the middle of the fiscal year OMB 
would have a reasonably good idea of what the rest of the year held in 
store. But it is quite possible we were wrong, and that there should 
be a longer lag on these variables. Accordingly, we reestimated a 
large subset of the equations in Table 3 with two different lags on 
these variables : first, two fiscal years prior to the one to which 
the estimates pertain; second, the prior calendar year. For example, 
the percentage changes that OMB recommended be made in agency budgets 
for fiscal year 1973 (July 1972 through June 1973 ) were submitted to 
Congress in January 1972 . In predicting these changes, the first 
alternative used the average inflation and unemployment rates for 
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fiscal year 1 971 (July 1970 through June 1 971 ) ,  while the second used 
the average rates for calendar year 1971. At any rate, neither of 
these changes made much difference. 
Finally, another important potential reason for the inability 
of this model to explain much variance may be that we are examining 
the wrong dependent variable . The OMB estimates and congressional 
appropriations being analyzed here are, as indicated earlier, for new 
budgetary authority, which empowers agencies to spend money for up to 
several years into the future. These figures are not for outlays, 
which pertain to the amount of money to be spent in the next fiscal 
year only. Evidence in a recent paper by Kamlet and Mowery (1981 ) ,  
though, suggests that in attempting to achieve short run fiscal policy 
objectives it is in fact agency outlays with which the OMB is 
primarily concerned. In contrast, they argue, congressmen and 
executive agency bureaucrats are more concerned about new budgetary 
authority.lo Unfortunately Kamlet and Mowery do not report any 
evidence on Congress, and examining the behavior of either Congress or 
the OMB with regard to outlays is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis. Suffice it to say for now that the agency budget estimates 
OMB submitted to Congress (expressed as a percentage of previous 
fiscal year appropriations )  tended not to systematically vary with any 
of the explanatory variables in our model .11 
IV. THE BOTTOM LINE : OVERALL CHANGES IN AGENCY APPROPRIATIONS 
In looking for election year effects upon the budgetary 
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process, we have examined separately OMB estimates for govermnent 
agencies as percentage changes over previous fiscal year 
appropriations (Table 3) and the percentage changes Congress makes in 
the OMB estimates (Table 2). We turn now to an analysis of the 
products of these two sets of actions�the overall changes in agency 
appropriations from one fiscal year to the next. 
Our main hypotheses are analogous to those tested in the 
congressional equations : (1) Changes in agency appropriations over 
the previous fiscal year will be more positive in election years than 
in nonelection years, and (2) this tendency will be stronger for those 
which supply particularistic, constituency-oriented benefits than for 
those which provide benefits which are primarily universalistic . As 
before, the model to be estimated here will specify inflation and 
unemployment terms, our predictions being that coefficients of the 
former should be negative and those of the latter negative . 
Because we are no longer interested in the behavior of the 
Congress vis-a-vis the OMB (or the OMB vis-a-vis the Congress ) ,  
however, the present model will differ from the previous ones i n  a 
couple ot important ways. First, we can simply dispense with the AOMB 
and ACONGPFY terms, which ref erred to prior actions taken by the OMB 
and by Congress, respectively. Secondly, we cannot adopt the party 
agreement index used in the previous set of equations. This index was 
designed to register effects which derived from whether or not the 
legislative and executive branches were controlled by the same party . 
Our concern now, though, is with the effects of party upon actions 
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taken upon agency budgets in a given fiscal year by both institutions. 
The party agreement index will thus be replaced by two terms, the 
first indicating the party of the President, the second, the party 
which holds a maj ority in the Congress . 
The resultant model is of the form : 
.MPP . 
1 ai + �li
u + �2iI + �3ipp + �4iPC + �5iE + µi 
where .MPPi = the percentage change in an agency ' s  appropriations over 
what it received in the previous fiscal year. 
ai = a c onstant term . 
U = the average unemployment rate during the previous fiscal 
year . 
I 
= the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index during 
the previous fiscal year . 
PP = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 where the 
President was a Democrat, 0 otherwise. 
PC = a dummy variable which taken on the value of 1 when the 
Democrats are the majority party in Congress, 0 
otherwise . 
E = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 for 
budgets considered during election years, 0 otherwise . 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
TABLE 4 
CHANGES IN AGENCY APPROPRIATIONS FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR 
c u I pp PC E 
Agencies Supplying Particularistic, 
Constituency-Oriented Benefits 
Extension Svc . 
Farmers Home 
Administration 
Rural Electri­
fication Admin . 
. 3 20 
- .519 
- .03 7 
Soil Conservation . 186 
Service 
Forest Service 
Bureau o:t 
Reclamation 
Bureau o:t Land 
Management 
National Park 
Service 
Bureau of 
Indian Affairs 
Fish and Wild­
Life Service 
Bureau of Mines 
- .125 
.808 
.079 
. 3 3 8  
- .001 
.107 
- .281 
Bonneville Power - . 042 
Administration 
- .004 
( .021) 
- .048 
( .065 )  
.022 
( . 015 ) 
.016 
( .016 ) 
- .011* 
( .005 ) 
.018 
( .019) 
- .009** 
( .004) 
- .072 
( .042 )  
- .349 
( .433 ) 
- .063 1 .43 2 
( .135 ) ( 1 .409) 
. 028 
( .030) 
- .098 
( .308) 
-.013 ** - .025 
( .004) ( .03 1 )  
- .286 
( .321 )  
.029 
( .040 ) 
.030 
( . 127 ) 
.023 
( .028) 
- .006 
( .030) 
.065** - .010 
( .025 ) ( .006 ) 
- .001 
( .050 ) 
- .118 
( .520 )  
- . 040 
( .048) 
.093 
( .05 7 )  
.032 
( .033 )  
.042 
( . 055 ) 
.016 
( .027) 
.047 
( .046 ) 
-.023 
( .03 9 )  
.090 
( .072) 
- .009 
( .014) 
.040 
( .114) 
-2 .240 .148 
( 1 .180) ( .109) 
- . 004 
( .008) 
.066 
( .066 )  
- .3 14 
( . 6 84 )  
- .040** - .025 - .405 
( .014) ( .110) ( 1 .141 ) 
- .012• 
( .007 ) 
- .023 * 
( .013 ) 
.002 
( . 011 ) 
- .001 
( .019 ) 
.015 
C .053 ) 
.024 
( .089 ) 
- .002 
( .074) 
- .025 
( .55 0 )  
- .336 
( .828)  
.626 
( .  752) 
.35 8** - .965 
( .131) ( 1 .3 66 )  
.082 
( .063 ) 
- .096 
( .105 ) 
.074 
( .051 ) 
.020 
( .081) 
.168* 
( .070) 
.172 
( .126 ) 
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I!? D .W .  
.28  2 .24 
.06 2 . 87 
. 3 0  2 .23 
.33 2 .41 
.35 2 .25 
.19 1 . 71 
.12 2 . 11 
.28 1 .5 6  
.20 1 .91 
.29 1 . 84 
. 24 2 . 17 
.32 2 .11 
Corps of 
Engineers 
Military 
Construction 
NASA 
Economic 
Dev . Admin . 
Office 01 
Voe . Rehab . 
Public Heal th 
Service 
Office of 
Educa tion 
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Table 4 continued 
c u I pp PC E R2 D .W .
.248 .063•• - .003 .007 - .960• .040 .28 1 .35  
( .022) ( .005 ) ( .044) ( .45 0 )  ( .041 ) 
.167 - .033 .012 .127 __ a - .131 .10 2 . 89 
-.320 
- .487 
( .062) ( .028) ( .16 9)  ( .154) 
.122• - .06 8• .022 
( .06 1)  ( .028) ( .16 7 )  
a .113 .41 
( .151) 
.99 
.058 .036 .065 __ a - .106 .32 2 .47 
( .059) ( .03 4 )  ( .16 8 )  ( .160) 
- .5 5 8  .033 .011 -.067 1 .566 - .046 .20 2 .06 
( .049) ( .014) ( .101) ( .881) ( .086 ) 
- .215 .109•• . 004 - .056 - .283 .035 .45 1 .16 
( .034) ( .010 ) ( .071 ) ( .625 )  ( .060) 
. 5 90 - .065 .014 .441 - .309 - .070 .09 2 .34 
( .169) ( .042) ( .33 7 )  ( .348 ) ( .321 )  
Agencies Supplying 
Primarily Universalistic Benefits 
Food and Drug -.108 .036 - .014* - .025 .176 - .006 .27 2 .10 
Administration ( .028) ( .007 ) ( .056 ) ( .574) ( .053 ) 
Federal Bureau .106 .001 - .001 .030 -.095 - .052 .10 2 .10 
of Investiga tion ( .018) ( .004) ( .03 6 )  ( .366 ) ( .034) 
Immigra tion and -.193 -.006 .000 - .03 7• .489* - .022 .29 2 . 17 
Na tural . Svc . ( .010) ( .003 ) ( .020) ( .209) ( .019) 
Federal Prison 
System 
Bureau of 
Narcotic s 
Bureau of 
Cus toms 
Bureau of the 
Public Debt 
- .170 - .002 - .000 - .126* .486 .022 .22 2 .14 
( .026 ) ( .006 ) ( .051 )  ( .53 0 )  ( .049 ) 
.165 - .012 -.014 .080 - .125 .019 .24 2 .46 
( .028) ( .008) ( .05 8 )  ( .5 0 7 )  ( .048) 
- .005 .004 .014 -.033 - .019 - .008 .27 1 .80 
( .020 ) ( .005 ) ( .041 ) ( .421 ) ( .03 9) 
- .656 -.010 .006 - .03 8 1 .176•• . 015 .3 8 1 .7 7  
( .017) ( .004) ( .035 )  ( .3 5 7 )  ( .033 ) 
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Table 4 continued 
c u I pp PC E R2 D .W .
Secret Service - .467 - .028 - .004 - .050 1 .278•• -.025 .29 1 . 84 
( .024) ( .006 ) ( .048) ( .491 ) ( .045 ) 
In ternal Revenue - .110 
Service 
.ooo - .006 • - .003 .293 -.013 .25 2 .33 
( .012) ( .003 ) ( .025 ) ( .255 ) ( .024 ) 
Bureau of the 
Mint 
- . 83 7 - .035 - .005 .051 1 .733 .162 .08 2 .5 9  
Bureau o f  Labor - .219 
Statistics 
Bureau of Labor - .033 
Standards 
Patent Office .109 
Weather Bureau - .296 
( .095 ) ( .024) ( .191 ) ( 1 .970) ( .181 )  
.051* -.020•• - .040 .204 - .001 .55 1 .36  
( .022) ( .005 ) ( .044) ( .451 )  ( .042) 
.095 - .017 - .072 - .123 - .212 .22 1 .98 
( .096 ) ( .027) ( .198) ( . 173 ) ( . 169) 
.001 - .005 - .020 - .050 - .043 .20 1 .91 
( .013 ) ( .003 ) ( .027) ( .265 ) ( .025 ) 
.055 - .006 - .033 .284 - .03 7 .19 2 . 7 8  
( .069) ( .017 )  ( . 121 ) ( 1 .276 ) ( .110) 
Geological Survey - .169 .045* - .001 .051 .064 - .048 .24 2 .3 6  
Coast and - .840 
Geode tic Survey 
National Bureau -1 .423 
of Standards 
( .025 ) ( .006 ) ( .050) ( .516 ) ( .048) 
.020 .010 - .116 1 .3 91 .091 .24 1 .47 
( .066 )  ( .016 ) ( . 116 ) ( 1 .227 ) ( .106 ) 
.107 .036 -.315 *  1 . 829 .060 .3 8 1 .3 9  
( .066 ) ( .019) ( .126 ) ( 1 .253 ) ( .118) 
Census Bureaub .319 .154 - .030 .157 -2 .03 1  .366• . 85 2 .16 
( .102) ( .025 ) ( .205 ) ( 2 . 13 7 )  ( .210 ) 
a This term could not be specified here because the Democrats controlled 
Congress during the entire time series for this agency . 
b The equation for the Census Bureau also contained dummy variables to 
control for the effects of the constitutionally manda ted decennial censuses . 
Significance tests are one-tailed . •• = p < .01; • = p < .05 . 
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Results derived from this model a r e  reported in Table 4 .  
There are few more equations than before which have serial correlation 
problems, but the Durbin-Watson statist ics remain generally well­
behaved . The model est imated h ere did a sl ightly better job of 
explain ing the data than did the OMB model (the median � was .27,
with virtually no differences between agency categories ) but a much 
poorer jpb than the congressional model . 
Turning to particular variables, we see  that the new pa rty 
control measures d id not top anyth ing syst ematic; signs of the 
presidential and congressional pa rty dummies were in the hypoth esized 
(pos itive )  direction less than half the time (15 of 37 and 16 of 34, 
respectively ) .  In short, Democratic control of either the Congress or 
the Presidency d id not tend to result in more budgetary growth for 
th is sample of agencies .  On the oth er hand, overall changes in agency 
appropriations were affected more consistently by the nature of 
economic conditions than were the changes proposed by the OMB . Over 
two th irds of the coeff icients associated w ith the unemployment and 
inflation terms were in the predicted direct ion, and a pretty fair 
number (6  and 11, respectively) were s ignif icant at the .OS level . 
Turning f inally to the election y ear dummies we see  that signs of the 
coeff icients were in th e predicted direction in only 12 of the 19 
equations for const ituency-oriented agencies and in only 7 of the 1 8  
equations for agencies in the other category . As was the case in the 
OMB equations, then, there was not a tendency for chang es in agency 
appropriat ions to be more pos itive in elect ion years than in 
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nonelection years .  
Now th is is not to say that the elect ion year generosity on 
th e part of Congress which we uncovered earl ier was not in ev idence 
here . A comparison of elect ion y ear terms across Tables 2, 3 ,  and 4 
shows that in v irtually every case in which Cong ress had t ended to 
treat an agency more favorably in elect ion y ears, overall percentage 
changes in its appropriations in election y ears were more pos itive 
than would have been true had the p ercentage changes proposed by OMB 
remained unaltered . However, th e magn itude of the percentage changes 
made by Congress in OMB est imates was on the average, much smaller 
than the percentag e changes these estimates represented over prev ious 
f iscal y ear appropriations . Moreover, the median correlation (P earson 
r) b etween the p ercentage ch ange OMB est imates represent over prev ious 
f iscal y ear appropriations and the p ercentage change in actual 
appropriations over those received in the prev ious f iscal year was 
. 87 .  In contrast, the median correlation between overall change in 
appropriations and th e percentage change Congress made in 0118 
estimates was only .15 . In other words, changes in agency 
appropriations are far more a function of the budget est imates which 
come out of OMB than of what Congress does to these estimates . 
Consequently, the results of this analysis approx imated the OMB 
findings much more closely than the congress ional f indings . 
V .  CONCLUSION 
The analysis reported above generated evidence supportive of 
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the hypo thesis that Congress treats the budgets of agencies which 
supply particularistic, constituency-oriented benefits more favorably 
in election years than in nonelection years. There did not appear to 
be any greater election year generosi ty on the part of C ongress with 
regard to those agencies which perform primarily universalistic 
services . The data also reve aled other important differences in 
congressional treatment of these two groups of agencies. In 
particular, the appropriations Congress awarded the constituency­
oriented agencies were influenced much more strongly by the level of 
unemployment in the economy and by the balance of party power in the 
federal government. 
Although the average effec t associated with election years was 
n ot negligible, the influence of the other political, economic, and 
institutional variables specified in this ba ttery of equations was f ar 
more impressive. Fur thermore, the impact of congressional election 
year generosi ty upon the appropriations process is qui te limited. 
This is because overall changes in agency appropriations are much more 
a function of the budge t estimates submitted to Congress by OMB th an 
of what Congress does to these estimates. And given that there were 
no important differences evident in OMB behavior be tween election 
ye ars and n onelection years, overall trends in actual appropriations 
were not much affected by elec tion year considerations either. 
Probably the most important finding which we had not 
anticipated was that the equa tions we estimated did a much better job 
of expl aining congressional appropriations decisions than actions 
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taken by OMB . True, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky ( 1966, 1973 ) 
report a similar pattern of results, but differences here were much 
starker than in their studies. Although Congress reacted to the 
nature of the estimate submitted by OMB for a given agency, OMB did 
n ot appear to react to how Congress had treated an agency's estimate 
in the previous fiscal year. C ongressional budge tary actions also 
reflected whether the executive and legislative branches were 
controlled by the same party or by different parties. Finally, it was 
Congress, not OMB, which appe ared to be more attune to national 
economic conditions . 
Now this is not to say that we know nothing about OMB, or that 
previous rese archers have found its behavior inexplicable. In 
particul ar, previous research by Crecine and his c ollaborators h as 
shed a great de al of light on the operation of this institution. 
Their work, however, has focused primarily upon internal OMB 
decision-making, the relationships be tween OMB and executive agencies, 
and the behavior of OMB in the context of executive branch budget­
making. The results of this analysis indicate that as we take a 
broader view of the environment in which this institution func tions, 
our ability to explain what it does decreases rapidly. 
1 .  
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FOOl'NOTES 
Such a situa tion, of course, poses an n-person prisoner ' s  dimemma 
in which the noncooperative solution is out-of-control spending . 
As Mayhew [1974] puts it, "There is a primal danger here that any 
taxing and spending body has to come to grips with" [p . 1 45 ] .  
Congress has historical ly dealt with this problem, he continues, 
by paying some members "internal currency" for engaging in 
"institu tional protective activities" ( i . g . guarding the 
Treasury) •that are beyond or even against their own electoral 
interes ts" [p . 1 46 ] . The most important rewards for this sort of 
service have been positions on the three "control committees" 
(Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means ) ,  which are invested with 
special power and prestige . 
It might be argued that elec tion year "permissive moods" 
are exac tly what these institutional safeguards are meant to 
counter . But as Fenno ' s  study makes clear, these committees are 
ul timately responsible to the parent body and must, at least 
partially, accomoda te its moods and expecta tions . In fact, his 
analysis of the House Appropriations Committee lends even more 
support to our second hypothesis�al though expected to guard the 
Treasury, the Committee is also expected to ca ter to individual 
members ' electoral needs, mainly by supporting their "pet 
projec ts . "  
2 .  Ferejohn (1974) found evidence o f  this sort o f  phenomenom in his 
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analysis of the Corps of Engineers . If the Budget Bureau 
recommended very few new starts, Congress would simply add 
several of them . He concluded that, "Apparently, if the Bureau 
wants to minimize the number of new starts in a given year, it 
should recommend about 14 or 15 proj ects rather than none" [p . 
SS ] .  
3 . O.MB estimates and final appropriations figures for these agencies 
were reported annual ly in the Senate Document Appropriations , 
Budget Es timates , Etc • •  in the section titled, "Itemized 
Comparison of Budge t Es timates and Appropriations Arranged by 
Appropriations Acts . "  
4 .  In a handful o f  instances several line items which customarily 
appeared under an agency in the regular annual appropriations act 
did not, but appeared instead in a subsequent supplemental ac t .  
In these cases these appropriations were counted toward the 
agency's funding for that year. In a l l  other cases the funds 
appropriated in deficiency and supplemental acts were for line 
items already covered in the regular annual act .  As sta ted 
above, these figures were almost always very small, and were not 
included in the fol lowing analyses . 
S . The 3 agencies in Fenno ' s  study which were not analyzed here were 
two extremely small divisions in the Labor Department ( the Wage 
and Hours Division and the Women ' s  Bureau ) and the Social 
Security Administration, which was dropped because of the 
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frequent incomparab il ity of f igures reported from one year to the 
next . 
6 . The only agency in the Interior Department not included in this 
category was the Geological Survey . Programs and agenc ies which 
were included but which do not appear in the Agriculture, 
Interior, or Public Works b ills are as follows : the Vocational 
Rehab il itation Service, which prov ided technical and f inancial 
support to states, local commun ities, and other organ izations and 
indiv iduals for a w ide variety of services to the disabled; the 
Public Health Serv ice, which d istributed funds to state and local 
health serv ices, financ ially assisted health professional and 
educational institutions, and funded grants for planning, 
research, and improving the del ivery of local health serv ices; 
the Off ice of Education, which funded construction of school and 
un iversity fac ilities and sponsored several other programs of 
benefit to teachers and students . As Sharkansk:y ' s  ( 1965 ) study 
demonstrated, the Off ice of Education se ized the opportunity 
presented by Sputnik and the perce ived "education gap, " and 
succeeded in becom ing the conduit for d irect benef its from the 
federal government to major groups w ith interests in education . 
Due in part to the strong pol itical backing it thus received from 
these interests, the Off ice of Education enjoyed a very rapid 
rate of growth dur ing most of the post-195 8 per iod . 
7 .  This equation is actually the f irst equation of a reduced form 
8 .  
9 .  
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two equation simultaneous equations model, but for the sake of 
presentat ional ease we discuss the equations separately . As w ill 
be seen later, the dependent variable in the second equation in 
this system is the AOMB term . This system is recursive, however, 
so OLS is an appropriate est imation techn ique . See Johnston 
(1972) p .  3 77 .  
Even after deflating into constant dollars, the med ian 
correlation (Pearson r )  between agency appropriations f igures and 
a time counter was . 86 . In contrast, the median correlation 
between t ime and the percentage changes in agency appropriations 
from what they received in the prev ious f iscal year was only . 1 1 .  
Tabular analyses of these data also showed that for 1 2  of the 19 
agenc ies in this category, the appropr iations they received from 
Congress in both election years and nonelection years was, on 
average, less than their OMB est imate, not more . It is thus far 
more accurate to characterize any election year generosity as a 
somewhat more perm iss ive attitude toward spending (which is 
consistent w ith Fenno ' s  description ) ,  and not as a w ild spending 
spree. 
10 . Kamlet and Mowery also point out that d ifferences be tween the OMB 
and the agenc ies in the emphasis placed on outlays versus new 
budgetary authority may result in a budgetary tradeoff, i . e .  
agencies will accept a lower level of outlays for the upcoming 
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fiscal year in return for som ewhat more obligational authority to 
apply to future years . The evidence they present, however, 
indicates that any such trades were generally confined to the 
Kennedy-Johnson years, and that there has not b e en a tendency for 
budgetary authority grant ed in previous fiscal years to build up 
over time. 
11. It s�ould be noted that we also examined the possibility that OMB 
behavior depended upon the type of el ection year. More
specifical ly, we suspected that OMB budget estimates might allow
for the most growth over the previous fisca l year when the
incumbent President is running for reelection . However, a simple
tabular analysis which differentiated between (1)  years in which 
the incumbent President was running, (2)  years in which the
incumbent was a lame duck, and (3 ) congressional biel ection years 
revealed no systematic evidence of higher OMB estimates in 
presidential reel ection years .
1 2 .  Use of such a variabl e  would b e  probl ematic if, as i s  the case 
today, one major pa rty controlled the House and the oth er 
control l ed the S enat e .  There were, however, no instances of 
divided control during the time period examined in this study . A 
possib l e  objection to this m easure is that it throws away too 
much data, and should have mad e finer gradations, e . g .  the 
D emocratic percentage in the House .  Our us e of th e dummy 
variabl e  specification, however, was based on a sense that it was 
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much more important to regist er the fact that a party had a 
majority (and thus control of l eadership positions and a l l  
committe e  chairmanships )  than t h e  actual siz e  o f  its majority . 
Specification of the pa rty agreement index used previously was 
also based upon this conside ration, and it , of course, performed 
very well in the congressional equations . 
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DATA SOURCES 
Budgetary data were taken from the Annual Senate Document 
Appropriations , Budget Estimates , Etc . ,  the section entitled nit emized 
Comparisons of Budget Estimates and Appropriations Arranged by Senate 
Acts . "  
A synopsis o f  agency activities can be found in the United 
States Government Manual, published annually by the O ffice of the 
Federal Register , National Archives and Records Service , General 
Services Administration , 
The Federal Gover11111ent Purchases of Goods and Services 
Implicit Price Deflator time series was taken primarily from The 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-74, 
Statistic al T ables . Data after that date are taken from monthly 
issues of the Survey of Current Business . Both are published by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U .  S .  Department of Commerce , 
The Unemployment and the Consumer Price Index figures were 
taken from issues of the Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics , U S .  Department of L abor . 
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